

# Geen autonomie voor de lokale zones zonder accountability

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# Autonomy? Good, but not without accountability



#### Why Autonomy?

- Informational advantages
- Local needs
- Adapted community work
- Approachability,
- Policing by concent
- Etc...

#### Best together with accountability and cooperation

- Textbook principal-agent issue
- Crime spill-overs
- Coordination issues



# **Accountability? Enough?**



#### Existing accountability system

- « Comité P » has monopoly
- Tools: complaints, inspections, etc.
- Not used: public reporting of quantitative indicators at the local police force level,
  - e.g. concerning the quality of service, customer satisfaction, police (mis-)conduct, feelings of insafety, financial stability, etc.
- No or only a negative and passive role for the citizen; "the client"
- Idea of community oriented policing



# **Accountability? Enough?**



Why don't we have an active role for the citizen in the accountability system?

- Privacy & Security?
  - True, but it is possible in neighbouring countries
    - https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/
    - http://www.veiligheidsmonitor.nl/
- The data do not exist
  - True, public policy towards less transparency
  - Rest In Piece, Safety Monitor?
- The production of policing services is difficult to quantify
  - True, but let's try!
  - Quantitative benchmarking



# **Quantitative Benchmarking? Idea**



#### Fair benchmarking by applying a "benefit-of-the-doubt" principle

#### **Developed tools**

- Are fully consistent with economic optimization
- Acknowledge the multi-input multi-output (or multi-divisional) production structure without imposing a parametric functional form
- Include the effects of non-discretionary environmental variables and external effects.
- Restrictions on weights to avoid specialization
- Benefit-of-the-doubt (after Melyn and Moesen, 1991): No arbitrary weights are assigned, each Decision Making Unit (DMU) is compared to other DMU's while using the DMU's most favourable weights!
- Thus, any other weighting of outputs leads to lower scores for the assessed DMU's.



# **Quantitative Benchmarking? Idea**



Fair benchmarking by applying a "benefit-of-the-doubt" principle

- Idea: For DMU i, if another DMU j, obtains a higher composite score when using the most favourable weights for DMU i, this means DMU j outperforms DMU i. DMU i is assigned a relative effectiveness score E<1. The value of the relative effectiveness score E gives the room for improvement in terms of satisfaction with the policing outputs
- If no other DMU j obtains a higher composite score than DMU i when using the most favourable weights for DMU i, then DMU i is assigned a relative effectiveness score E=1.



### **Quantitative Benchmarking? Applications**



#### Public sector applications:

- Education (The Netherlands)
- Electricity distribution (Finland)
- Prisons (England & Wales)
- Politicians (France)
- Railway control centres (Belgium)
- ....
- And... local police forces (Belgium)

Rogge, N. and M. Verschelde, 2013, A composite index of citizen satisfaction with local police services, Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 36 (2), p.238-262.

Verschelde, M. and N. Rogge, 2012, An environment-adjusted evaluation of citizen satisfaction with local police effectiveness: Evidence from a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis approach, European Journal of Operational Research, 223 (1), p. 214-225.





# Environment-adjusted evaluation of citizen satisfaction with local police effectiveness

- Use the Safety Monitor 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008-2009 (n=209)
- Outputs: 6 basic police tasks
- The seventh (traffic) was only introduced in 2009
- Weights are endogenously selected
- Weights should lay in an interval which we construct, using a survey of 63 local police force chiefs
- Control for socio-economic influences (substance income rate, green pressure), typology, year effects and regional differences





#### **Outputs**

Wijkwerking

1. Te voet of per fiets patrouilleren

2. De aanwezigheid in de straat

3. De info over de activiteiten

4. Goed contacten leggen met de burgers

5. Ten dienste staan van de burger

Onthaal

1. Telefonische bereikbaarheid (laatste delict)

2. Bereikbaarheid op het politiecommissariaat (laatste delict)

3. Beschikbaarheid en bereikbaarheid van de politiedienst

(ander politiecontact)

Tevredenheid m.b.t. gemeenschapsgerichte basispolitiezorg

Interventie

1. De snelheid van de tussenkomst (laatste delict)

2. De tijd die aan uw probleem werd besteed (laatste delict)

3. Resultaat van het politieoptreden (laatste delict)

4. Houding en het gedrag

5. ledereen op gelijke voet behandelen

Slachtoffers van misdrijven opvangen

Lokale recherche

Slachtofferbejegening

1. Inbraken en diefstallen ophelderen

2. Geweld bestrijden

3. Vandalisme bestrijden

4. Drughandel bestrijden

Handhaving openbare orde 1. De wegen veiliger houden


2. Publieke plaatsen veiliger maken

3. Orde handhaven tijdens sportmanifestaties





#### Weight restrictions








#### Results

	Average	St.Dev.	Min.	Med.	Max.
1-dimensional (relative)	0.91	0.06	0.72	0.93	1.00
BoD-score	0.90	0.06	0.73	0.91	1.00
Conditional BoD-score	0.93	0.05	0.79	0.94	1.00



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
#### Results








#### Additional results









Conditional BoD score





#### Additional results











#### Additional results





#### Additional results







# **Quantitative Benchmarking? Way forward**



#### To ensure optimal conduct within local police forces, we need:

- Bigger & better data
- More transparency
- More involvement of the citizens

One way forward: collaborations with academic institutions to install fair quantitative benchmarking tools. See www.qu-be.eu



